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Extended Abstract
This issue of tax-motivated income shifting within multinational firms – or “base erosion and
profit shifting” (BEPS) – has attracted increasing global attention in recent years. By
exploiting differences between the tax system of two different jurisdictions, multinationals
can often reduce their tax liabilities in either or both countries. For example, recent empirical
evidence suggests that German MNCs paid 27 percent less in taxes than a group of
comparable domestic firms in 2007 (Finke, 2013). In the UK, taxable profits relative to total
assets reported by foreign multinational subsidiaries are 12.8 percentage points lower than
those of comparable domestic standalones, based on analysis using UK corporate tax return
data (Habu, 2016).
In response, many countries have implemented policies to limit the extent of profit shifting
by multinationals—for example transfer pricing regulations or thin capitalization rules –with
the objective of raising domestic revenue collection and curbing unfair competition that
affects the profitability and growth of domestic firms competing with lower-taxed
multinationals (OECD, 2013; Fuest et al, 2013). However, multinationals are often at the
global productivity frontier, providing positive externalities for other firms in the local
economy (Andrews et al, 2015). Because multinationals are often more mobile than
domestic firms, the potential benefits of anti-avoidance legislation could be undone if
multinationals respond by cutting their investment and reducing their presence in the local
economy. In consequence, “unilateral movement to restrict opportunities for tax planning
might affect multinationals investment and reinforce tax competition...” (Keen, 2001; Janeba
and Smart, 2003; Peralta et al, 2006; Bucovetsky and Haufler, 2008)
Though this important issue has largely been ignored in the current policy debate, we
consider in this paper the impact of anti-avoidance regulations on investment in fixed assets
by multinationals in the introducing countries, using variation in the introduction and
enforcement of transfer pricing regulations and thin capitalization rules (Figure 1). Data on
1 De Mooij: International Monetary Fund (RDeMooij@imf.org). Liu: International Monetary Fund
(lliu@imf.org).
2transfer pricing regulation are from Mescall and Klassen (2014), while data on thin
capitalization rules are from the IMF’s Fiscal Affairs Department database.
Figure 1. Worldwide Introduction of Anti-Avoidance Measures
Panel A. Transfer Pricing Regulations
Panel B. Thin Capitalization Rules
Theoretical Consideration. We first illustrate the impact of anti-avoidance measure on the
scale of multinational in a simple framework similar to that in Crevelli et al (2015),
distinguishing the differential impact of anti-avoidance measure on the scale of real
3investment by multinational affiliates in the host country, and on the scale of real investment
worldwide by the multinational group. It does so by adding the possibility of profit shifting to
the standard model for analyzing international tax effects of real investment (Zodrow and
Mieskowski (1986) and Wilson (1986)), while allowing for anti-avoidance measures to
increase the cost of profit shifting. Specifically, the model predicts that the scale of real
investment by multinationals would decrease unambiguously in the strictness of the anti-
avoidance rules. On the other hand, the impact of any change in the anti-avoidance measure
in country i on the scale of total investment by the multinational group would depend on a
number of additional factors, including how the introduction of the anti-avoidance measures
affects the difference between the after-tax rate of return in country i’ and the after-tax rate of
return in the global capital market.
Data. Our primary dataset for empirical analysis is an unbalanced panel of 130,062
companies in 29 countries for the years 2006 to 2014. It is constructed by using
unconsolidated financial statements of affiliates of domestic and multinational company
groups in the commercial ORBIS database provided by Bureau van Dijk. A company is
defined as a multinational affiliate if it has an ultimate parent company owning at least 50%
of its shares and locating in a foreign country. A company is defined as a domestic affiliate if
it has an ultimate parent company (owning at least 50% of its shares) locating in the same
country, and all the other affiliates of its parent company are located in the same country.2
The main accounting variables are investment in fixed capital assets, sales, cash ow, and
earnings before interest and tax (EBIT). We compute investment spending (    ) as changes in
fixed capital assets (including the net book values of tangible and intangible fixed assets)
plus depreciation, i.e.         −     +                         , where     denotes the book value of fixed
asset in year t. Gross investment rate,                       , is defined as the ratio between current-
year gross investment spending and beginning-of-year net fixed capital asset. Sales refers to
operating revenue and profit margin is calculated as earnings before interest and tax (EBIT)
divided by sales. All ratio variables are winsorized at top and bottom 0.01 percentile to
minimize influence of outliers. Data on other country-level variables including the statutory
corporate tax rate and macroeconomic characteristics (including GDP per capita, the growth
rate of GDP per capita, population and unemployment rate, that capture the aggregate market
size and demand characteristics in the host country) are from the IMF's World Economic
Outlook database. Table 1 present the summary statistics of the key variables used in the
regression analysis.
2 The comparison is thus between investment by multinationals and by domestic group, excluding all
independent, stand-alone companies.
4Table 1. Summary Statistics
Empirical Strategy. We use a difference-in-difference (DD) to identify the causal effect of
transfer pricing regulation on multinational investment, by exploiting plausibly exogenous
time-series variation in the effective cost of capital following the introduction of TPR in
many countries. Intuitively, if adoption of a TPR raises the effective cost of capital for
multinationals, we would expect a subsequent reduction in their investment relative to
investment by domestic company groups. Formally, we test the investment response in the
standard DD specification:
                          =     +     +               ×           +             +           +         , (1)
where i indexes firms, k indexes host countries, and t indexes time. The dependent variable
                          denotes gross/net investment scaled by book value of fixed capital asset in
(end of) year t-1. We control explicitly in this specification changes in investment due to
other non-tax factors, by using a control group of domestic company group in the same host
country which are exposed to aggregate shocks similar to those experienced by the
multinationals and controls for additional non-tax determinants of firm-level investment. The
5key variable of interest,         , is an interaction term between two indicators: an indicator
equal to one for multinational affiliates and zero otherwise (         ), and an indicator equal
to one following the introduction of some transfer pricing regulation and zero otherwise
(          ). The coefficient       represents the difference-in-different estimate of the effect of
transfer pricing regulation on investment by multinational affiliates, and is expected to be
negative following theoretical discussion.
Throughout the various specifications based on equation (1), a full set of firm fixed effects
(    ) is always included to control for unobserved heterogeneity in firm-level productivity and
in their parent company characteristics. Firm fixed effects further subsume host-country fixed
effects (given that affiliates do not change their location), controlling for time-invariant
differences across host countries that may affect the location choice of multinationals. These
considerations could include, for example, perceived average quality of governance during
the sample period, common language and/or former colonial ties with the home country, and
geographical distance between the home and host country. We also include a full set of time
dummies (    ) to capture the effect of aggregate macroeconomic shocks, including the effect
of the great recession, that are common to both multinational and domestic companies.        
denotes a vector of firm-level non-tax determinants of investment including proxies for firm
size, degree of financial constraints, and profitability, and         is the error term.
Most specifications include the statutory corporate tax rate in the host country (or
alternatively, a set of country-year fixed effects), to control for potential confounding effects
of concurrent tax reforms on business investment. We also control for a set of time-varying
country characteristics (       ) for host countries, including GDP per capita, population size,
and unemployment rate to capture the effect of time-varying local productivity, market size
and demand characteristics on investment. More importantly, our most comprehensive
specification includes a full set of industry-year fixed effects, country-year fixed effects and
country-industry fixed effects that control for industry and country specific trends and
macroeconomic factors that may differentially affect private investment by multinationals
and would otherwise be captured by the DD estimates.
Our identification strategy rests critically on the assumption that prior to the introduction of
transfer-pricing regulations, there is no differential changes in investment by multinationals
relative to domestic companies, conditional on changes in non-TPR factors that are already
controlled for empirically. We perform placebo tests to check the validity of the
identification assumption by examining whether there was a differential change in
multinational investment in any of the pre-TPR years. Figure 2 summarizes the pre-reform
DD estimates and their corresponding 95% confidence interval. The results suggest that on
average, there were no significant differential changes in investment for the treated group in
any period before the TPR reform.
6Figure 2. Placebo Test: DD estimates prior to Transfer Pricing Regulation
Summary of Main Findings Our main findings suggest that following the introduction of
transfer pricing regulations, multinational affiliates reduce their investment as a share of
fixed assets by 1 to 3 percentage point. The main regression results are summarized in Table
2. Column (1) reports results from the basic investment regression without inclusion of any
country-level controls. The DD coefficient estimate is negative and significant at 1% level,
indicating that the introduction of transfer-pricing regulation has a negative impact on
multinational investment.3 The coefficient estimates on the non-tax firm-level determinants
of investment are also highly significant and consistent with previous findings in the
literature. In particular, the results suggest that firms that less financially constrained on
average invest more in fixed capital assets than their cash-poor or less profitable peers. There
is also a positive and significant relationship between firm-level investment and the rate of
growth in sales.
3 A full set of firm fixed effects and year fixed effects are always included throughout varying specifications.
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7Column (2) checks the robustness of the baseline finding by including country-level statutory
corporate income tax rate, population, unemployment rate, exchange rate, real GDP per
capita, and GDP growth rate. This is to ensure that the DD estimate is not confounded with
any other contemporaneous changes in the introducing country that may also differentially
affect investment by multinationals. While the result remains qualitatively similar, inclusion
of country-level characteristics slightly reduces the magnitude of the DD estimate from -
0.027 to -0.024.4
The next three columns further check the robustness of the baseline finding by subsequently
adding two-way country-year fixed effects in Column (3), two-way industry-year fixed
effects in Column (4), and two-way country-industry fixed effects in Column (5). In the most
comprehensive specification in Column (5), the DD estimate is around -0.01, suggesting that
on average the adoption of the transfer-pricing regulation reduces investment by
multinationals by around 1 percentage point. Given that the average investment per dollar of
fixed asset is around xxx for multinationals in the sample, this translates to around xxx
percent decrease in their investment.
Finally, column (6) includes a triple interaction term involving                 , a variable that
measures the overall strictness of the transfer pricing regulation. Intuitively, stricter transfer-
pricing regulation would have a larger impact on the effective cost of capital faced by
multinationals, therefore damping their investment by a larger extent. This is indeed the case
as suggested by the negative coefficient estimate on the triple interaction term, which is
around -0.021 and significant at 1% level.
Table 2. Baseline Findings
4 However, the difference in the DD coefficient estimates are not statistically significant.
8Heterogeneity analysis. We also find that the negative impact of transfer-pricing regulation
is mainly concentrated in large, more complex multinationals, and is smaller for
multinationals with a higher share of intangible assets.5 We also find that MNCs reacted
quickly in the first year following the introduction of the transfer-pricing regulations, which
sees the largest reduction in their investment. This is consistent with that investment decision
is forward-looking. The introduction of transfer-pricing regulations also has some lasting
impact, given that multinational investment continues to exhibit a decreasing trend several
years into the post transfer-pricing regulation regime. We further consider the joint impact of
transfer pricing regulations and thin capitalization rules, and find that while the effect of thin
capitalization rule is estimated to be insignificant, introduction of the transfer pricing rule
remains to have a negative impact on multinational investment.
Next steps on the impact of transfer-pricing regulation on industry-level TFP. We will
assess the impact of transfer-pricing regulations on industry-level revenue productivity that
reflect the extent of resource misallocation across firms (Hsieh and Klenow, 2009). There
are at least two channels through which the transfer pricing regulation may affect industry-
5 We provide two explanations for the latter finding. First, products of firms with a higher share of intangible
assets are often more specialized, making it more difficult to find comparable price. This in turn makes it easier
to shift profits through transfer mispricing and implies that transfer pricing regulations are less binding for firms
with intensive intangible assets. In addition, multinationals often use a variety of profit-shifting methods, and
alternative methods of profit shifting through licensing and royalty payment are easily available for firms that
are intangible capital intensive.
9level revenue productivity. First, given that the transfer pricing regulation would not affect
the effective statutory tax rate on domestic firms, it would reduce the dispersion in effective
tax rates between domestic and MNCs, hence leveling the playing field and reduce the extent
of resource misallocation. On the other hand, transfer pricing regulation will also affect the
production efficiency of MNCs. By raising their effective tax rate, it is likely to drive away
less productive MNC investment, as the remaining investment needs to be relatively more
productive in order to equalize the same after-tax rate of return in the introducing country.
Therefore, while the introduction of TPR may reduce total production, it is likely to have a
positive effect on industry-level total revenue productivity.
To carry out this empirical exercise, we will analyze changes in industry-level TFP post the
introduction of transfer pricing regulation, relative to that in countries with no transfer
pricing regulation during the sample period. We will also explore the share of multinational
activities in each industry as a second source of variation for identification. We expect that
this analysis would provide additional insights on the impact of anti-avoidance measures on
the real economy.
Timing of this project. We are in the process of finalizing the productivity analysis, and aim
to have a first-version working paper within the next month. The working paper
incorporating additional new analysis will definitely be available before the summer
symposium in June.
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